Zhou Chun

Zhou Chun is an Assistant Professor at Zhejiang University Guanghua Law School. Her research focuses on corporate law, securities regulation and comparative corporate governance. She has published in academic journals including the Law Review, Journal of Securities Law and Northern Law Review. Her current research interests include hostile takeover regulation and fiduciary duty in the asset management industry in China.

She received her LLB and PhD from Peking University Law School and her LLM from Columbia Law School. While studying at CLS, she was the article editor of Columbia Journal of Asia Law and was honored a James Kent Scholar.

Designation: Zhejiang University Guanghua Law School
Institution: Zhejiang University Guanghua Law School
Paper: The Futility of Hostile Takeovers in China
Abstract: "China’s emerging hostile takeover market has become the darling of the international business world. Following waves of unsolicited takeover bids over the past five years, people have been predicting successful hostile takeovers to arrive. The combination of takeover regulations modelled after the UK, depressed share prices following the 2015 stock market crash, and cash-rich insurance companies eagerly looking for vulnerable targets should have made a booming hostile takeover market a foregone conclusion. But China’s hostile takeover market remains a mirage. Virtually no takeover bid has ever succeeded. The corporate control market is littered with high-profile failures, such as Baoneng’s unsuccessful takeover attempt of Vanke in 2016. I argue that notwithstanding optimism from pundits and investors, it is the futility – and not success – of hostile takeovers that is inevitable in China. The confluence of idiosyncratic local factors, such as China’s state-dominated controlling shareholder environment, institutional reluctance to enforce takeover regulations to facilitate takeovers, and government intervention at both central and local levels, render a successful hostile takeover all but impossible. China is a cautionary tale to those who would predict hostile takeovers only with reference to financial indicators or over-generalization of the Anglo-American experience without a full appreciation of China’s unique domestic regulatory and political environment"